"There are some sorts of industry, even of the lowest kind, which can be carried on no where but in a great town. ... In the lone houses and very small villages which are scattered about in so desert a country as the Highlands of Scotland, every farmer must be butcher, baker, brewer for his own family. ... The scattered families that live eight or ten miles distance from the nearest of them, must learn to perform themselves a great number of little pieces of work, for which, in more populous countries, they would call in the assistance of those workmen." (Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, p. 17)
Since Adam Smith if not before, the determination and distribution of labor market earnings have occupied the attention of economists. Recently, a vast literature has emerged establishing that earnings inequality in the US and elsewhere has grown dramatically over the last four decades. During the 1980's and 1990's inequality across groups deepened considerably while within group (or residual) inequality has also grown markedly since the 1970s. (See Autor, 1999, and Machin and van Reenen, 2007 , for a survey and overview.) Although debate continues notably regarding the most recent trends (Card and DiNardo, 2002 , Lemieux, 2006 , Sattinger 2007 , skilled biased technological change appears to be the most plausible cause for the rising spread in earnings across groups.
Unfortunately, skilled biased technological change, as well as other prominent explanations, offers little help in understanding the changes in residual wage disparity. 1 To address this shortcoming, this paper presents a model of earnings that incorporates labor market frictions and sector specific training into a Roy model of occupational choice. 2 Suppose workers choose how much training to acquire for potential jobs before investigating and then choosing among available employment options in different 1 Unobserved differences among workers is perhaps the most compelling argument (Lemieux, 2006) , but this explanation is by its very nature difficult to test. Theories that build upon market frictions and the sharing of quasi-rents offer an alternative approach. See Van Reenen (1996) , Lloyd-Ellis (1999) , Casselli (1999) and Kambourov and Manovskii (2004) . 2 Specialization in the Roy model without personal investments and without assignment frictions has been examined in detail. See Heckman and Honore (1990) , Heckman and Sedlacek (1985) , Willis and Rosen (1979) for expositions of the way in which self-selection affects the distribution of income and empirical evaluation of wage functions among individuals with heterogeneous abilities. Eleftheriou (2008) examines wage inequality in the Roy model with matching frictions but does not consider human capital investments or derive analytic results.
occupations. Following Adam Smith's lead, the likelihood with which an agent trades in a particular occupation, modeled here through assignment frictions, reflects the extent of the market for different occupations.
3 Agents take account of these frictions in their choices. The extent of the market determines not only training investments and the degree of skill specialization but also the level and distribution of earnings. Matching outcomes affect the division of labor.
This simple set-up links market frictions with different levels of human capital investments as well as uncertain income outcomes. Total training and aggregate income all rise as the extent of the market increases, that is, as the market thickens and assignment becomes more certain. This result is not surprising; however, the composition of human capital alters the distribution of these gains. As the extent of the market widens and workers become more able to locate the jobs they desire more, they specialize more in the acquisition of human capital. While greater specialization improves expected income, it exposes workers to a greater down side risk of not locating the more desired employment opportunity. More individuals match well but the unfortunate who do not locate jobs in their more desired sector have less training to fall back on and suffer lower incomes. As such, greater specialization increases the earnings divide between those who match well and those who do not. Less insurance through diversity is taken out against the less likely bad draw. Earnings within groups spread out and under some conditions leads to greater inequality. 4 Dispersion of income does not necessarily converge monotonically with a reduction in frictions.
3 Adam Smith emphasizes geographical dispersion in trading probabilities due to the extent of the market.
Here the interpretation is on the improvement of matching over time in the frequency with which agents have the opportunity to trade. This specification abstracts from Adam Smith's second reason for the gain in productivity. There is no capital in the model so Smith's third rationale is also absent.
4 Motivated by their empirical findings, Kambourov and Monovski (2004) also emphasize the importance of occupational human capital and matching frictions to resolve within group wage inequality variation. They argue, however, that increased variability of productivity shocks generate more occupational mobility. When coupled with experienced-related, occupation specific human capital, this shift accounts for a large share of overall wage inequality. Here, the simple two period model can be extended to allow for periodic transitions. Indeed it is possible to have mobility rise with matching rates. Such generality is left out in order to highlight the simplicity and intuition of proposed mechanism. Like Kambourov and Manovskii, occupation specific human capital is critical in this paper.
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Although the focus of this study is on the way assignment frictions and sector specific human capital interact to alter the distribution of income for a particular ability group, it is possible to formulate comparisons across different groups by contrasting responses by ability. Comparisons of this sort line up with the growing disparity across groups and offer a complementary approach to skilled biased technological change for understanding the divide between groups. In particular, under standard conditions, the model also offers a potential explanation for the rise in inter-group heterogeneity documented in the literature.
Some Observations
Does better occupational matching generate greater specialization and higher within group earnings dispersion? Evidence on specialization and occupational specific matching is difficult to come by but some observations from surveys of undergraduate students at US universities and colleges help motivate the proposed argument. Table 1 documents the course credits for business, computer science and engineering students within and outside their field for three cohorts between 1972 and 1993. Despite some minor reductions in total credits, the overall pattern for these students is one in which they concentrate more in and around their chosen field while taking fewer outside options. For instance, engineers are receiving more hours of tuition in their discipline with fewer hours spent in disparate areas such as social science. The same general pattern holds in computer science and business majors albeit with slightly less clarity. The picture is none the less one in which students are less diversified. Based on this evidence bachelor degrees appear to be more concentrated in particular fields of study. The findings here can alternatively be related to differences across geographic areas.
For instance, the stylized picture of the US economy over the last thirty years is of an economy with flexible labor markets (low matching frictions and hence low unemployment rates) as well as high but widely dispersed income growth. On the other hand, several European countries are generally viewed as having more rigid labor markets along with lower per capita income that is however more evenly distributed. The basic mechanism outlined in this paper suggests that these observations are consistent with matching frictions affecting the types of skills workers acquire and the resulting distribution of labor market earnings.
The Economic Environment
This section presents a (homogeneous) Roy (1951) occupational choice model with human capital acquisition and uncertain assignment. The model is highly stylized in order to highlight the basic insight and the underlying mechanism behind the idea that reducing matching frictions will not only increase income, productivity and employment but can further make income more disperse by altering investments in different types of risky skills. Individuals experience three distinct life phases. In the first phase, an individual invests in a portfolio of occupation specific human capital skills. In the second phase, the individual explores islands in the economy for employment opportunities in these two 5 The motivating evidence above focuses fits with familiar search due to data scarcity and difficulties finding more general measures of assignment frictions. 6 Allowing for multiple periods of repeated search and employment raises issues related to the observational content of individual income levels over time. In general, the results hold for a cross section of the population but observations over time are less clear cut and depend on the frequency and duration of the search and employment phases. 8 occupations. In the third phase, the individual chooses from the available opportunities to produce and consume output.
Homogeneity focuses attention on within group differences. Given within group results, comparisons among heterogeneous groups follow from comparative statics with respect to ability. Note as well that the homogenous type specification adopted here is more narrow than grouping individuals by total accumulated education levels. Since there are a potentially large number of different (a 1 , a 2 ) groups who acquire the same total (observed) training, using total education can muddle the picture of within group effects.
Human capital acquisition
Innate ability requires training to become productive. Endowed talent in each skilled sector becomes effective only when combined with occupation or sector specific human capital (h 1 ,h 2 ) acquired through training in the first phase of life. Given that skills are sector specific, if a worker fails to receive an employment opportunity in a particular sector, any acquired human capital for that sector becomes redundant. Moreover, when choosing a (h 1 ,h 2 ) portfolio, individuals knowingly face the possibility that the second phase of search might not uncover opportunities to produce in one or both of the skilled sectors.
Suppose an agent who acquires h i units at cost c per unit can potentially produce
where φ(h) = h α /α and α∈(0,1). Although some resultsthose related to human capital investments -can be established for general specifications of the production function φ(.), the parameterization adopted here permits the finding of explicit expressions for individual earnings and hence economy-wide income distribution. Without an explicit expression for φ(.) these results would not be available.
On the other hand, the broad results do not necessarily depend on the explicit functional form. Similar remarks apply for the adoption of linear utility.
Matching
Agents search (with recall) over islands throughout their entire second life phase.
Each island contains an opportunity in one of the two skilled sectors. Opportunities within each sector are the same. Let ρ∈(0,1) represent the proportion of islands with opportunities in sector 1. For example, if (as in the original Roy model) the two sectors are hunting and (fresh water) fishing, each island contains either a lake or a forest but not both.
Normalize the duration of this second phase to a unit of continuous time and let λ be the rate at which agents find new islands. As the arrival rate captures market thickness, the comparative static implications of having λ increase will be the focus of what follows.
A constant arrival rate of islands over the second life-phase period implies that the probability of encountering N islands is Poisson and denoted here by
Given the proportion of opportunities across islands, the probability of finding at least one island with an opportunity in sector 1 is then given by
Similarly the likelihood of finding at least one sector 2 employment opportunity is denoted by
The probability of finding one or more opportunity but all of them in sector 1 is likewise calculated as 
Production and consumption
In the third phase of life, individuals produce and consume. To keep things straightforward, assume that agents consume their own production. Production goods are perfect substitutes. The absence of meaningful exchange at this stage prevents prices from adjusting in response to different allocations of agents across islands. This restriction, however, is not critical. It is possible to generate the basic results found here with more general preferences and trade that enable prices to adjust as agents' opportunities vary over time. The mechanism is less transparent and not developed here.
Individuals who find only one type of skilled occupation or do not find any skilled production opportunities have simple choices. When only one skilled sector opportunity is available, the lone skilled opportunity will be taken, provided any skills have been developed. Individuals with both skilled opportunities available have a slightly more complicated problem. They choose their most profitable occupation to work in based on abilities and human capital investments.
Investment and Specialization
earn a number of highly specialized and closely related qualifications -say by obtaining particular technical qualifications. Once training is complete, the individual looks for offers. In the musician/chemist example, the individual may come across places to play music or to work at a lab. In some instances, both opportunities turn up and the worker can choose which to pursue. In other instances, no opportunities exist and the individual works in the unskilled sector.
An agent with a choice of occupations will opt for the one generating the greatest income. Given human capital training decisions, sector 1 is chosen if and only if
The nontrivial decision an individual faces is to chose sector specific investments h 1 and h 2 to maximize expected income :
where agents take the matching probabilities p 1 = p 1 (λ) and p 2 = p 2 (λ) exogenously. 
and
Notice that
Maximizes EY 1 and that 
and λ is small, agents prefer sector 2 but as markets thicken and λ increases they will at some point prefer sector 1. As shown in the appendix, (4) is monotonic in λ so that this switch can occur at most once.
Since individuals may switch sectors as markets expand, two steps are considered in order to gauge the effects of market thickness. The first step considers the impact of market growth for a given (a 1 , a 2 ) within a preferred sector, that is without a change in the primary sector. As illustrated below, a rise (over time for instance) in matching probabilities represented by a rise in λ not only induces an increase in overall training, (a natural result), but also alters the composition of the human capital portfolio. Expected income rises in thicker markets but the dispersion changes as well. The second step weighs the impact on decisions and economic outcomes when individuals swap preferred sectors. On the other hand, the likelihood of ending up in the secondary sector depends on the probability of not finding a primary sector position as well as the probability of finding a secondary sector opportunity. As a result, investment in secondary occupation skills Although secondary training may either rise or fall, the increase in primary training is always sufficiently large so that both total investment in human capital, h 1 +h 2 , and the portfolio spread, h 1 -h 2 , increase with λ. The impact of matching frictions on specialization, defined here as the proportion of total human capital in the primary sector (even though it is feasible that h 1 < h 2 ), follows accordingly. "The division of labor ...occasions, in every art, a proportionable increase of the productive powers of labor. The separation of different trades and employments from one another, seems to have taken place, in consequence of this advantage. This separation too is generally carried furthest in those countries which enjoy the highest degree of industry " (p. 5)
Sector shifting
As market thickness rotates (1), the preferred sector can change. Such a switch has no impact on the total amount of training acquired; however, the portfolio becomes more balanced.
When (1) holds with equality, individuals do not favor a particular sector; however, those who opt for making sector 1 their preferred choice acquire the same total level of training as those who opt for sector 2: Although switching sectors has no effect on the level of total training, discrete changes occur in sector specific investments, employment rates and specialization. In the newly preferred sector, investments and employment jump up whereas the old preferred sector experiences a discrete drop. The more interesting concern is whether the portfolio becomes more or less balanced. 
Income
Human capital adjustments lead directly to changes in the expected value as well as the distribution of income. As noted above, total investment in human capital increases as the extent of the market, captured by λ, grows and the p i rise. Suppose again that a 1 > a 2 and λ are such that sector 1 is preferred. Higher investments yield higher mean or Recall that ∂(h 1 -h 2 )/ ∂λ < 0. Indeed, it may turn out to be the case that these secondary sector workers acquire absolutely less training if ∂h 2 /∂λ < 0. In either case, the spread in skilled sector earnings, S = a 1 φ(h 1 ) -a 2 φ(h 2 ), rises in thicker markets: 
represent the respective income differences between sectors 1 and 2, between sector 1 and the unskilled sector, and between sector 2 and the unskilled sector, each multiplied by the number of people involved.
Plugging in the human capital choices gives The accompanying rise in specialization, on the other hand, causes greater income inequality. As primary sector matching improves, skilled income spreads creating greater inequality among the high and low earners, thereby offsetting the income equality gains that come directly from better matching prospects. Abusing notation somewhat, the effect through specialization on the Gini is given by :
The net effect is ambiguous. For λ sufficiently large, this derivative is negative.
Nearly all individuals are earning high, primary sector earnings. On the other hand, it is straightforward to find cases where earnings inequality increases with λ. These examples reveal that improved matching associated with thicker markets do not necessarily lead to predictions of either more or less earnings equality.
Sector switching
By construction, agents have equal expected income when the evolution of λ induces a move from preferring one occupation to the other. Income dispersion, however, is altered when this transition occurs. Let 
Recall that if an individual switches primary sectors from sector 2 to sector 1, it must be the case, among other things, that p 1 < p 2 . Given this restriction, it is then straightforward to establish that S -S / > 0 if and only if α >1/2. Two factors underlie this outcome. As shown above, when individuals switch their preferred sector, they invest more evenly in occupational human capital. The more balanced portfolio reduces the income spread. On the other hand, after the switch occurs, individuals are now investing in their innately more gifted ability -a shift from sector 2 to sector 1 requires abilities such that 1 < a 1 /a 2 < [(1−ρ)/ρ] α where ρ < 1/2. Increased investment in higher innate ability spreads primary and secondary income. The net effect depends on the curvature of the human capital production function.
The Gini can likewise rise or fall at the occupational switch. As individuals swap sectors, a discrete jump occurs. Suppose G and G / represent the Gini when occupation 1 and occupation 2 are the preferred sector. Since total investments are equal at the switching threshold, the jump in inequality when (1) 
It is not difficult to find examples in which the earnings inequality jump from this expression can discretely rise or fall when agents switch sectors.
Comparisons Across Types
To assess differences in earnings across groups, the paper turns now to the way in which changes (induced by market expansion) in expected gross earnings as well as changes in the distribution of earnings vary by ability.
8 Although definite predictions do not emerge for all λ, the analysis demonstrates the way in which thicker markets can provide greater benefits on average for the more well-off as well as create more pronounced dispersion within more affluent groups, results that accord with some recent observations mentioned above.
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Again assume that agents all prefer the same sector -sector 1 -and consider first the relationship between ability and the changes in expected income due to market expansion. The cross partials for the two abilities are: The relationship between the changing spread and abilities does not entirely carry through to changes in earnings inequality. When matching frictions decline, the impact on the Gini change due to ability are given by : Although the Gini is a more involved measure of dispersion than the spread in earnings, the driving factors none the less can be seen at play in the Gini results.
Discussion
Over the last hundred years, income has grown steadily yet the distribution has exhibited an uneven progression, see for example Goldin and Goldin 23 and Margo (1992) . While a number of opposing factors may be at play, this paper argues that this pattern can follow from a gradual improvement of matching rates in different occupations. A smooth convergence or divergence should not necessarily be expected as the evolution of the distribution of income can exhibit arbitrary patterns.
The key factor is within group specialization in sector specific human capital.
Improved matching in the primary sector generates greater specialization which in turn leads to greater income disparity between the well matched and the poorly matched.
Increased residual disparity is more pronounced among the more able.
Other factors undeniably alter the distribution of income, both within and across groups. The mechanism outlined here complements these other factors by offering a simple explanation for the rise of within group earnings dispersion. 
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